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Abstract
Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems
associated with moral hazard in cultivation (Tuscany), or in providing an important
‘rung’ on the farm ladder (US South). Yet despite these and other important features,
sharecropping is surprisingly absent in many, if not most other settings. Using case
studies associated with French wine production, this paper argues that a number of
factors have often been overlooked in the literature: 1) the need for landowners to be
able to offer farms that were both sufficiently large to employ full time the
sharecropper’s family, and allowed them to produce a variety of products to minimize
risk; 2) measurement problems associated with the division of the harvest, especially
when quality was an important factor in determining farm price; 3) and the nature of
vertical co-operation and integration associated with the production and marketing
arrangements of individual crops explains that landowners were not indifferent to
receiving payment in cash or kind, and this affected contract choice. This paper
incorporates these ideas to explain not just the presence and absence of sharecropping in
different geographical localities, but also the wide variety of different forms of the
contract that existed in Europe.
Economic historians in recent years have shown considerable interest in
institutions that govern economic transactions. The current revisionist views have
emphasized how institutions as diverse as craft guilds, serfdom, or the Maghribi traders
were economically efficient in overcoming problems of asymmetrical information and
missing markets.2 Sharecropping is one institution which has been radically
reinterpreted over the past couple of decades, and while the Physiocrats or Adam Smith
considered it a major break on agricultural growth, and hence economic development in
France, many economists today believe it a useful contract for resolving problems
associated with risk, moral hazard, or a tenant’s lack of collateral. This paper argues that
the rehabilitation of European sharecropping by economic historians has been
exaggerated, being based on just a handful of examples, usually from wine producing
regions.3 These studies present seemingly good arguments to explain the use of the
1 Financial assistance has been provided by SEJ 2006-08188/ECON and ECO2009-10739.
2 Recently Sheilagh Ogilvie (‘Economic Institutions’) has argued that negative externalities, such as rent-
seeking, offer as good, if not better explanation for their presence.
3 For the links between sharecropping and viticulture, see in particular, Hoffman, ‘Sharecropping’; Epstein,
‘Tuscans’; Cohen and Galassi, ‘Sharecropping and Productivity’; Galassi, ‘Tuscans’; Carmona and
2contract in localities as diverse as Tuscany, Burgundy, or Catalonia, but fail to explain
why the contract was not found elsewhere.4
A number of factors have often been overlooked in the literature, including the
need for landowners to be able to offer farms that were both sufficiently large to employ
full time the sharecropper’s family, and allowed them to produce a variety of products
to minimize risk. In addition, although the literature has emphasized the advantages to
be gained with using sharecropping contracts to monitor labour, it has overlooked the
equally important measurement problems associated with the division of the harvest,
especially when quality was an important factor in determining farm price. Another
shortcoming is that contract choice has usually been considered as an annual bargaining
game between two non-competing economic agents, when in reality agriculture requires
both cooperation and long term investment in fixed assets such as soil fertility,
buildings or trees. Finally too little attention has been given to the nature of the
commodities actually produced, and in particular why landowners might be happy to
receive fifty per cent of the harvest on some occasions, but at other times demand cash
with fixed rent agreements, or all the harvest when using wage labour. By ignoring
other production decisions which determined the boundaries and governance structure
of the farm, and in particular the extent and consequences of vertical integration found
in agriculture and the processing and marketing of farm produce, the literature fails to
fully understand the nature of contract choice. This paper incorporates these ideas to
explain not just the presence and absence of sharecropping in different geographical
localities, but also the wide variety of different forms of the contract that existed in
Europe. It considers France which, along with Italy, was the European country most
closely associated with sharecropping, and looks at viticulture, the crop most frequently
cited in the literature as being suitable for the contract.
The first section examines the recent literature on sharecropping and the
organisation of the farm, and argues that contrary to accepted opinion, the contract was
unlikely to be present in viticulture. If this was the case, then landowners needed to
develop alternative contracts which they considered were more efficient. Section two
looks at contract choice with fine wines (Bordeaux, Burgundy and Champagne), and
this is followed by a section on premium wines where sharecropping was used
(Beaujolais). Section four looks at the presence of the contract on the large estates
Simpson, ‘Rabassa Morta’; Ackerberg and Botticini, ‘Agrarian Contracts’; Ackerberg and Botticini,
‘Endogenous Matching’; and Biagioli, ‘La Mezzadria Poderale’.
4 Federico, Feeding the World, notes the rarity of sharecropping in most countries.
3producing cheap wines in the Midi, and the final one in areas of polyculture in south-
west France.
1
Historically the most widespread form of organisation in agriculture is the
family farm, which is competitive because of the low costs of supervising labour.5 In
farming, output is highly sensitive to the timing and quality of effort, and often
deficiencies in these areas only become apparent after the harvest. Even then, it can be
difficult to determine whether a poor crop was caused by the worker’s negligence or by
exogenous factors such as adverse weather conditions. The family farm provides strong
incentives for labour to carry out tasks diligently and over time members can acquire
important human asset specific skills linked to their land, which allows them to be more
productive than if they have to keep changing farms each year.6 Another consideration
is that until recently there are only very limited economies of scale in most forms of
agriculture, allowing the family to compete successfully with large estates or
plantations.7 These characteristics, and the fact that workers seek to own land to
increase their incomes and gain security for old age, implies that in traditional
economies the great majority of farms are worked by their owners, even though they
might occupy only a relatively small part of a country’s land area. In France in 1892 for
example, 85 per cent of all farms had less than 10 hectares, accounting for 30 per cent
of the cultivated area. By contrast, just 2.4 per cent of farms had over 40 hectares,
responsible for 37 per cent of the land.8
How to replicate the incentive structure for effort and careful work associated
with the family farm are behind the decisions concerning contract choice taken by those
owners who do not cultivate the land themselves.9 At different ends of the spectrum are
fixed rental contracts and direct cultivation using wage labor. The major advantage of
rental contracts is that they provide strong incentives for tenants to maximise output
(and hence their ability to pay high rents), but they usually contain limited ones to
maintain soil fertility, or care for fixed assets (buildings, trees, vines, etc.). By contrast,
owners cultivating directly their land with wage labour have to create adequate
5 Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami, ‘Land and Labor Contracts’, p.1970 suggest that 80% of the world’s farms
were in 1970 were cultivated by their owners.
6 For asset specificity, Williamson, Economic Institutions, p.242. See also Allen and Lueck, ‘Agricultural
Contracts’, pp.477 and 486, and Rosenzweig and. Wolpin, ‘Specific Experience’, p.962.
7 See, for example, Foster and Rosenzweig, ‘Rural India’, p.1.
8 Chevet, ‘Peasant France and Capitalist Britain’, Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
9 The French census of 1892, whose accuracy is discussed in appendix, suggests that 52.7 per cent of land
was directly cultivated (faire-valoir direct) using family and/ or wage labour; 36.4 per cent leased
(fermage), and 10.9 per cent sharecropped (métayage). France. L'enquête …1892, pp.236-7.
4incentives to avoid workers from both shirking and damaging fixed assets.
Sharecropping falls between these extremes, and the literature provides three broad
explanations for its use: risk-sharing, producer incentives and moral hazard, and the
presence of market imperfections for inputs other then land.
Farming is an inherently risky business, as not only do individual farmers face
the possibilities of a total loss of their harvest because of inclement weather or disease,
but prices can collapse while the crop is still in the field. Sharecropping, in contrast to
fixed rental tenancies, shifts part of the risk of harvest failure to the supposedly less risk
averse landowners. However, a number of objections to the tenant’s risk aversion as
being the determining factor in contract choice have been raised. First, landlords using
fixed rental contracts are sometimes expected to help their tenants in years of poor
harvests, effectively sharing risk with them.10 Furthermore, the empirical evidence
provides little support for the argument that the sharecropper is more risk averse than
the landowner, leading some authors to assume that both parties were risk neutral.11
Finally, landowners and tenants can ‘mix contracts’ (i.e. workers in theory by working
for several different landlords, and landlords hiring workers on a variety of contracts).12
Small owner-occupiers typically reduce risk by using the family endowments of
land, labour and capital to produce a variety of different income streams, a feature
especially important with a crop such as wine, where the coefficient of variation in the
size of the harvest was four times greater than with other crops.13 In France there were
1.6 million hectares of vines and 1.6 million growers in the 1900s, resulting in large
numbers of minuscule plots worked by part-time producers.14 If owner-occupiers sought
to diversify, so would sharecroppers, and this presented a problem for large landowners
to attract potential tenants, as they had to offer land that allowed multi-cropping
(polyculture), or permit sharecroppers to work for others (and thereby introducing
inefficiencies). To reduce monitoring costs, it was common in France and Tuscany to
offer farms large enough to employ the sharecropper’s family full time, and prohibit
10 Griffiths and Overton, Farming to Halves, pp.127-30.
11 Allen and Lueck, The Nature of the Farm, p.10, and Ackerberg and Botticini, ‘Agrarian Contracts’, pp.
253-4, although see also Ackerberg and Botticini, ‘Endogenous Matching’ which does not rule out the
possibility of risk in determining contract choice. By contrast, Joseph Read has argued that sharecropping
reduces aggregate risk rather than redistribute it, as it created incentives for both landowners and tenant to
change production plans during the growing season in response to deviations from expectations caused by
factors such as adverse weather. Reid, ‘Market Response’, pp.125-6.
12 Stiglitz, ‘Incentives and Risk Sharing’, p.219.
13 Toutain, ‘Le produit’, cited in Loubère, The Red and the White, p.121.
14 Lachiver, Vignoble Français, p.583. The 1924 census shows that almost 70 per cent of all French wines
were found on holdings of less than five hectares. Our calculations, Galet, Cepages .
5them from working elsewhere.15 However, there were potentially only a limited number
of landowners who were able to offer farms of both an adequate size, and with
conditions to permit sharecroppers an acceptable crop mix to reduce risk.
Alfred Marshall argued that transaction costs with sharecropping were high,
because neither the landowner nor tenant received the full marginal return from
increased labour and capital inputs, encouraging both to be undersupplied.16 Recent
studies, by contrast, have emphasised that the transaction costs associated with effort
are actually less on a family farm worked by sharecroppers, than using wage labour.
Furthermore, landowners will prefer sharecropping to rental contracts when it is
possible to damage fixed assets which affect future harvests (buildings, trees, soil, etc.).
For example, with a crop such as the vine, output is highly sensitive to the quality and
timing of labour inputs and the plant itself can be easily and permanently damaged if the
pruning, ploughing, and hoeing operations are badly carried out.17 As one writer noted
in 1807, ‘no crop suffers more from the omission or poor quality of work, requiring
many years to recover from the abuses of a single year’.18 This explains the almost total
absence of rental contracts in viticulture, while the use of wage labour was rare because
of the close monitoring required to reduce the risks of opportunistic behaviour of the
workers was too costly for most landowners.19 Consequently Ackerberg and Botticini
show for Early Renaissance Tuscany that when choosing contracts, ‘sharecropping
seems to have been particularly dominant on those estates where perennial crops, such
as olive trees and vines, where grown. Meanwhile, estates where cereals were the main
crops were usually leased out for fixed-rent contracts’.20 However, while sharecropping
might efficiently reduce problems of moral hazard in cultivation, it created other
15 When an exact match was not possible, landowners preferred to rent farms greater than the
sharecropper’s labour supply, making them responsible for monitoring the effort of the additional labour.
Antoine, Fiefs et Villages. For western France, Carmona, ‘Livestock Specialization’, p.239, shows that
farm size was double the national average when sharecropping contracts were used in 1892.
Mechanisation significantly reduced monitoring costs by the late twentieth century.
16 Marshall, Principles, pp.534-37. The problem is significantly reduced if the share that the tenant
received was 70 or 80 per cent, as in Catalan viticulture. Carmona and Simpson, ‘Rabassa Morta’, p.297.
17 Galassi, ‘Tuscans and Their Farms’, pp.78-83, Hoffman, ‘Sharecropping’, p.315 and Carmona and
Simpson, ‘Rabassa Morta’, pp.292-3.
18 Boutelou, El Cultivo de la Vid, p.66.
19 See especially Guyot,Ėtude des Vignobles, vol. 3, pp.668-9.
20 Ackerberg and Botticini, Agrarian Contracts’, p.244. See also Allen and Lueck, ‘Agricultural
Contracts’, p.482 who, while not specialists on Europe, write that ‘land contracts were chosen in response
to the costs of enforcing contracts over assets with many attributes. The dominance of cash rents in
England and northern Europe can be explained as the result of the relative dominance of small grain and
grass farming, similarly the dominance of cropsharing in Romance countries can be explained as the
result of the relative dominance of orchard crops’.
6transaction costs associated with the division of the harvest, which could be significant
when quality was an important determinant of farm prices.21
Another common explanation for sharecropping is the presence of market
imperfections for some factor input besides land. For the sharecropper, as noted, this
involved supplying and supervising family labour, although they also managed hired
labour, especially at the harvest.22 By contrast, the landowner’s contribution included
not just land, but goods such as technical know-how or managerial ability.23 Farm
management might involve not only organising the timing of activities such as the start
of the harvest, but also planning responses to exogenous shifts in factor and commodity
prices, or the appearance of new labour-saving or biological technologies. Landowners
also sometimes supplied credit, and Arthur Young noted for France in the late
eighteenth century that some tenants were simply too poor to accept fixed rental
contracts.24 In this case farm equipment and working capital was advanced by the
landowner to the sharecropper, with the future harvest used as security. Griffiths and
Overton have also recently argued that this was found on occasions in England, and that
‘farming to halves’ allowed the possibly of capital to be accumulated, as landowners
found a productive use for their land and livestock, while tenants could become
established with limited resources.25 But sharecroppers sometimes did have access to
credit, and at times were themselves landowners.26 A market imperfection such as the
tenant’s inability to tap credit markets often disappeared over time, making the need for
sharecropping redundant, but new imperfections could appear elsewhere, leading to the
introduction of the contract.27
Contract choice also needs to be linked to the nature of vertical co-operation and
integration associated with the production and marketing arrangements of individual
crops and livestock. In particular, the literature often assumes that the landowner was
indifferent to receiving payment in cash or kind. While, this might indeed have been the
case with cereals where spot markets existed, it was not true with crops such as grapes,
which required immediate processing, or most fruit and vegetables which had relatively
short shelf-lives, demanding a high degree of vertical coordination. Landowners’
21 Fruit in south west France was never sharecropped for these reasons. Montgailhard, Le Métayage, p.9.
22 Eswaran and Kotwal, ‘Contractual Structure’, pp.353-4 and Roumasset, ‘The Agricultural Firm’.
23 For plantations in the US South, see Reid, ‘Market Response’, p.126.
24 Young, Travels in France, p.297. See also Bloch, French Rural History, p.148 and Epstein, ‘Tuscans’,
pp.118-9.
25 Griffiths and Overton, Farming to Halves, for example, pp.3, 110, 121-6.
26 For small holders and the credit market, see especially Postel-Vinay, La Terre et L'argent, pp. 48-50.
27 Eswaran and Kotwal, ‘Contractual Structure’, p.360, note for the Postbellum US South, that ‘with the
abolition of slavery, the previously used supervision technology of the landlords was no longer feasible
and the absence of managerial ability among the emancipated slaves made sharecropping inevitable’.
7decisions on contract choice therefore sometimes carried important implications on the
extent that they were to be involved in downstream operations associated with
processing and marketing farm produce.
Another restriction found in much of the theoretical literature is that the
sharecropping contract is usually described as a ‘one-period noncooperative game’,28
even though the empirical literature shows that many contracts, which were nominally
only for a year, often lasted for several decades or passed from father to son.29 Long
term contracts allowed sharecroppers to become more productive as they accumulated
human asset specificity linked to the land, which encouraged them to undertake non-
observable investments, especially important as new biological technologies were often
needed just to maintain yields.30
Differences in tenant’s time horizons can be shown by two very different life-time
earning patterns in the historical literature. In the US South, the contract is usually
explained as a rung on a farm ladder that saw the tenant move from labourer, to
sharecropper, tenant and finally landowner, as they accumulated capital, skills and
reputation over their working life.31 By contrast, in a region such as Tuscany, there was
no obvious ladder. Instead the sharecropper acquired high levels of human asset specific
skills linked to a particular plot of land, which implied that both landowners and tenants
stood to lose if the contract was brought to a premature end, leading to stable lifetime
incomes for tenants and a guarantee of a skilled labour force for the landowner.
One major restriction to the use of sharecropping with a crop such as viticulture,
but rarely mention in the literature was the division of the harvest.32 If this took place in
the vineyard, the landowner needed to be present to avoid the theft of grapes, and ensure
that the different varieties, together with under- and over-ripe fruit, were divided equally
between the two parties. For exogenous reasons, vineyards were usually highly
fragmented, and the landowner would have considerable difficulties in monitoring a
number of geographically dispersed plots throughout the village.33 The grapes then
needed to be transported quickly to the landowner’s cellar to avoid fermentation
beginning prematurely in the field. A less time-critical moment for dividing the harvest
28 Ibid., p.365,
29 For example, Garrier, Paysans, pp.152-3 and Tourdonnet, Situation Du Métayage, pp.37, 72 and 102.
30 Bandiera, ‘Contract Duration’, pp.956-7 stresses the importance of non-observable investments. For
biological technologies, see especially Olmstead and Rhode, Creating Abundance.
31 Wright, Old South, New South and Alston and Ferrie, ‘Time on the Ladder’..
32 Allen and Lueck, Nature of the Farm, p.116 note for the United States in the late twentieth century, that
when ‘output becomes more variable, the opportunities for the farmer to underreport (in effect, steal) the
crop increases’, either by misreporting volume or quality.
33 This was traditionally because many were located on south-facing hillsides, and on marginal land.
Inheritance laws also contributed to fragmentation.
8was after fermentation, but the possibilities for sharecroppers to cheat were even
greater. Wine could be stolen, and the small scale of production implied that there were
usually plenty of wine-making facilities in a village for sharecroppers to hide part of
their harvest from the landowner. As wine quality varied, sometimes considerably, from
vat to vat, and barrel to barrel, good wine could be removed before the division by a
dishonest tenant and replaced with poorer wines brought from elsewhere. It was also
customary in France for grapes to be pressed several times, with water and sugar added
to the latter pressings to make inferior wines. Once again the presence of inferior wines
in the cellar made it relatively easy to cheat landowners, both concerning the quantity
and quality of the harvest. Unlike the merchants, who could simply reject inferior
wines, landowners were obliged to accept them as rental payment from their
sharecroppers.
[MAP 1]
Problems such as the division of harvest, risk (and the tenant’s desire to multi-crop),
or the monitoring of effort on highly fragmented plots, all help explain why
sharecropping was comparatively rare, 8.3% of the total area of vines in France in 1892,
less than for some other crops. Yet in a number of important French wine regions such
as Burgundy, Beaujolais, or Armagnac, as well as Tuscany and Catalonia, it was
common (see Map 1). Furthermore the fact that there were different tasks which had
many dimensions to perform in the vineyard (Table 1) led to the creation of different
contracts that encouraged workers to work quickly, but not at the expense of reducing
product quality of damaging fixed assets. These were similar to sharecropping in so far
as it was the labourer who organised the work in their own time, but differed because
they were paid a fixed salary rather than a share of the harvest. Table 2 shows a number
of these, as well as the major sharecropping contracts. A broad distinction can be made
between those contracts used to plant and bring vines into cultivation (complant), and
those used for annual cultivation Classical sharecropping contracts, where the
landowner contributed the land, and the tenant the labour, can also be contrasted with
the sophisticated labour contracts (such as prix-faiteurs), which resolved specific
problems of moral hazard and monitoring for landowners, and allowed vineyard
9workers to acquire human asset specificity.34 The rest of this paper looks at contract
choice in France’s different wine regions.
[TABLE 1]
[TABLE 2]
II
The typical organization structure in the late nineteenth century was a family
operated vineyard making its own wine, which was then sold to wholesale merchants
who blended it for the hundreds of thousands of small retailers in urban areas.35
However, in a number of select areas in France, a few landowners specialized in fine
wines, substituting quality and high prices for volume. The organization of production
of fine wines differed to that of vin ordinaire.36 Not only was there was a strictly limited
area of favourable land (terroir) to produce them, but considerable care was required in
carrying out the different activities, and in the vineyards there were high levels of
human asset specificity. For example, there was a major difference between a task such
as trimming leaves in the early summer being technically carried out correctly, to that
where the worker had to know exactly how many leaves to remove in a particular year
on each vine to guarantee that the grapes received neither too much, nor too little, direct
sunlight. This could not be accomplished by ‘monitoring’ in the traditional sense, but
required high levels of decision making by the workers themselves.
Fine wine production also needed large amounts of capital as producers
deliberately reduced output to improve quality, while labour inputs were considerably
greater, with the harvest, for example being collected three or four times to guarantee
only perfectly ripe grapes were used. Winery equipment was also of a better quality
(e.g. use of oak barrels) and many of labour-saving technologies such as mechanical
crushers found elsewhere were rejected in case they harmed the wine. The wine, instead
of being drunk immediately, was matured several years before being marketed. Finally
producers had to withstand significant financial losses in years of poor harvests.37
34 This paper excludes those cases such as the tiers francs contracts found in Burgundy and Champagne
which were used when the owner was physically unable to cultivate the vines themselves. Conseil
Economique et Social, Métayage, 1.
35 Sempé, Régime Économique du Vin, pp.104-6.
36 See especially the highly observant, Busby, Journal of a Tour, pp.106-7.
37 Simpson, Creating Wine.
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Despite the potential advantages of sharecropping to provide the high levels of
human asset specificity and care were required, its use was conspicuously absent in
Bordeaux and Champagne, and had been abandoned in Burgundy by the mid-nineteenth
century. A classic sharecropping contract, which split the harvest in some
predetermined way, was unattractive because the high quality grapes needed to be
transformed to make fine wines, which involved skills and capital that vineyard workers
did not possess.38 In other words, product quality was improved because of the division
of labour. There were also problems of moral hazard. Wine quality varied significantly,
even from one barrel to another, and sharecroppers would need to trust the landowner
handed over equal quantities of good as well as bad wines. For the estate owner (and
merchants), the fraudulent use of brand names was a major problem, and these preferred
to maintain control of all the wine. As a result, the landowner kept the whole harvest
and hired skilled wine-makers, while the labourers were rewarded by high wages in the
vineyard. The organisational structure of fine wines was very distinct, so is necessary to
look briefly at different regions to understand fully the nature of contract choice.
From the seventeenth century large areas of the Haut Médoc were reclaimed
allowing a small number of growers in Bordeaux access to land that produced wines
which commanded significantly higher prices than vin ordinaire. The estates survived
the Revolution and although the vineyards were not excessively large, with Château
Lafitte for example being only about 65 hectares, there were considerable economies of
specialisation and large quantities of labour employed.39 The leading estates made the
wine exclusively from the distinct grape varieties grown on their own vineyards, rather
than buy from outside growers,40 and the wines were sold under the name of the château
and not that of the merchant.41 In the vineyards, workers (prix-faiteurs) were given the
responsibility for all the skilled operations on a fixed area of vines, usually slightly less
than three hectares, in exchange for accommodation, heating, cheap wine for family
consumption, a small garden and a salary (Table 3).42 This provided high powered
incentives for workers to accumulate the necessary human specific asset skills, organise
38 Landowners hired the best wine-makers and spread production costs over as large a quantity of grapes
as possible. Fine wines were blended by the wine-maker rather than the merchants to create the final
product, and they required close control of the whole production process in order to guarantee suitable
supplies. In poor years, wines sold for considerably less than cost, making a division of the harvest
unattractive to growers.
39 Shaw, Wine, the Vine and the Cellar, p.263.
40 The leading estates refer to those in the 1855 Bordeaux Classification, which has been widely used to
this day as an indicator of quality. Markham, 1855 and Simpson, ‘Selling to Reluctant Drinkers’.
41 Prior to 1860 however the shipper’s name was also sometimes added as an additional guarantee.
Salavert, Le Commerce des Vins, p.66.
42 Cocks and Féret, Bordeaux and its Wines, p.45 and Conseil Economique et Social, Métayage, pp.222-
25
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the work themselves, and left them enough free time to tend their own vines, or earn
extra wages doing piece work. They worked closely with the management, and in
Château Latour for example, many prix-faiteurs worked there for decades, with a son
following his father as vigneron.43
[TABLE 3]
Unlike Bordeaux, the major champagne maisons outsourced for a significant
quantity of their grapes. This was originally for historical reasons, as before the
nineteenth century boom, and the vineyards were already owned by small growers
producing ordinary wines for the Parisian market.44 Situated on the northern edge of
feasible grape growing, viticulture was especially risky, and production on the heavily
fragmented holdings was labour intensive, with high levels of asset specificity.45 Wine
quality varied considerably, according to both year and location, and the maisons had to
carry large, expensive stocks, creating important barriers to entry for small producers.
Buoyant demand led to high prices for quality grapes however, and attempts by the
champagne houses to hold down prices artificially had only limited success.46 In
suitable areas, small owner-occupiers were therefore encouraged to produce quality
grapes, and the maisons helped them in their fight against phylloxera and replanting of
their vineyards.47 Only when grape supplies became restricted because of the creation of
a regional appellation and the growers’ lack of capital to replant after the First World
War, did the large houses begin to integrate backwards by purchasing vineyards which
were then worked by wage labour.
Burgundy wines had an early reputation for quality and in the words of Thomas
Brennan, Upper Burgundy (Côte-d’Or) in the eighteenth century offers ‘the classic
example of vineyards so isolated from markets that they were forced to develop superior
and expensive wines’.48 There were few large holdings, and most of these were broken
43 Higounet, Château Latour, p.101. The contract however could not protect vineyard owners completely
from adverse movements in wine prices and labour costs, and in the 1930s there were complaints about
the work quality of some prix-faiteurs. France. La Gironde, p.163.
44 Champagne production increased from 50 to 240 thousand hectolitres between 1832 and 1914.
Loubère, Wine in France and Italy, pp.109 and Faith, Champagne, p.209. Guy, Champagne.
45 In the Marne there were 14,430 growers with less than a hectare of vines; 3,202 with between one and
five hectares; 89 with between five and twenty, and just 18 with more than 20 hectares. "Le Vigneron
Champenois.",2 juillet 1902. Three hectares is probably the maximum a family could work in this region.
46 ‘Ridley's Wine and Spirit Trade Circular’.
47 Simpson, ‘Cooperation and Conflicts’ and Guy, Champagne.
48 Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne, p.11. The pinot noir grape used in the region’s fine wine yielded
only about 15 hectolitres the hectare.
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up during the Napoleonic period.49 Landowners owned a large number of scattered
holdings creating potentially high monitoring costs if worked with wage labour.
Sharecropping was widespread until the mid nineteenth century, with the landowner
being heavily involved in the winemaking and marketing.50 Sharecroppers in theory
received half the harvest, but in practice the landowner often claimed it all as they had
advanced money and goods to the tenant during the year.51 With the increase in wine
prices after 1850, fine wine producers switched from sharecropping contracts to a
simple labour contract, the vigneron a prix d’argent.52 This was similar to Bordeaux’s
prix-faiteurs, and involved employing skilled workers and their wives to cultivate a
fixed area of vines for a salary. The labourers also often owned a few vines, but were
dependent on wage payments and paternalistic help from landowners to obtain a
guaranteed annual income. Contracts were annual, but usually renewed over many
years.53 For landowners the advantage of a simple labour contract was that they did not
have to split the increasingly valuable wine with their tenants. Nevertheless, high
salaries after the Second World War produced a revival in interest in sharecropping,
although now the tenant received a cash payment rather than a share of the harvest.54
III
The vineyards of Beaujolais and Maconnais were closer to navigable water than
those of upper Burgundy, and viticulture from the seventeenth century grew rapidly in
response to the Parisian market. The region, in particular Haut (northern) Beaujolais
where the hillside was especially steep, benefited from a growing reputation and high
prices from the mid nineteenth century.55 Sharecropping represented between 30 and 40
per cent of all vines in 1882, but reached 80 per cent in the north.56 Beaujolais and
Maconnais wines, although not as good as those of Bordeaux or Burgundy, were called
le grand ordinaire de France, and large land owners using sharecropping obtained
prices that were at least double what small, owner-occupiers achieved in the same
49 One old estate that had been owned by the Church, the Clos de Vougeot, was broken up and its 50
hectares of vines today are divided among 80 growers.
50 Laurent, Les Vignerons de la ‘Côte d'Or’, 1, pp. 279-80.
51 Ibid. p.278.
52 Ibid., p.280. See also Guyot,Ėtude Des Vignobles, p.82 and Caziot, La Valeur de la Terre, pp.386-8.
53 Martin and Martenot, L'histoire des classes, p.542.
54 Conseil Economique et Social, Métayage., vol.2, p.143-5.
55 Garrier, Paysans., vol. 1, p.270, notes that planning vines (el minage) cost between eight and ten times
more than further south.
56 The importance of sharecropping was widely recognised by contemporaries. For example, Cochard
and Aigueperse, quoted in Myard, Vigneronnage, p.213, Tourdonnet, Situation Du Métayage, p.179-80,
and Conseil Economique et Social, Métayage., vol.2, pp.414-5.
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region, with the difference increasing between 1850 and 1940.57 In the light of this
paper, two questions seem especially pertinent: how did landowners monitor the
division of the harvest, and why did they prefer sharecropping to some other form of
labour contract such as the prix-faiteur found in Bordeaux?
In Beaujolais the typical property had between 12 and 40 hectares of vines, but it
was sub-divided and cultivated by between five and fifteen sharecroppers in standard
units called vigneronnage.58 Tenants were given about two hectares of vines, and one
and half hectares of pasture for livestock, sufficient to keep a family and domestic
servant fully employed. The sharecropper was required to reside on farm, and the family
prohibited from working elsewhere, but the milk, butter and cheese provided an
important supplement, and helped them survive phylloxera or moments of abnormally
low wine prices. 59 If the sharecropper owned land themselves, they were expected to
rent it to others.60 Landowners were responsible for all the major production decisions,
including the choice of grape varieties and pruning methods used, as well as the timing
and methods to be used in replanting after phylloxera (1875-90), the degree of
mechanisation, or when to begin the vendange.61 However the role of the sharecropper
was decisive. The hills and the high density of vines made viticulture in Beaujolais
especially labour intensive and mechanisation expensive. The sharecropper was
responsible not just for working the vines, but also in supervising the harvest and wine
making, which could involve as many as twenty people, and he was required to be
married, so that his wife would provide food for the workers. 62 When harvesting was
expensive, landowners preferred to give up their share of the remains of the grapes that
would be divided (marc), rather than to make a cash contribution,63 as was often the
case elsewhere with sharecropping in France, where landowners sometimes paid part of
the harvesting costs or those associated with farm servants.64 Contracts were annual,
57 Burel, Le Vignoble Beaujolais, pp.71-2. Other suggest a higher figure: Enquête …1866, 27, p.570,
gives a figures of between 40 and 85 francs for fine wine; 25 and 40 for ordinary one; and 16 and 25 for
poor wines. In Maconnais, the range was 60 and75; 40 and 60; and 20 and 40 francs respectively (France.
Enquête…1866,14, p.329. See also Vermorel and Danguy, Les Vins, pp.15-7. The grape variety used was
the gamay, which produced an inferior wine to Burgundy’s pinot noir, but yields were considerably
greater, at 50 hectolitres / hectare.
58 Myard, Vigneronnage. Garrier, Vigne et Vignerons, p. 137, estimates that large estates which accounted
for 60 per cent of the wine area in the region of Brouilly, each had at least six sharecroppers.
59 Chatillon, Le Beaujolais Viticole, p.67. Even so, contemporaries commented on the poor quality of
these dairy products, which were always of secondary importance to wine. Cheysson, L’habitation, p.228.
60 Ibid., p.221.
61 Myard, Vigneronnage, pp. 208-9 and Goujon, La Cave et le Grenier, p.105.
62 Myard, Vigneronnage, p.193, Burel, Le Vignoble Beaujolais, p.118 and Judt, Socialism in Provence,
p.257.
63 Burel, Le Vignoble Beaujolais, p.47.
64 Carmona, ‘Livestock Specialization’, p.253.
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but the nature of the terrain led to high levels of human specificity, and many
sharecroppers remained for long periods.65
Unlike Bordeaux or Burgundy, the harvest was carried out rapidly in only three
or four days, and sharecroppers made the wine using their own equipment although, to
avoid cheating by the sharecropper, this equipment was always located within the
landowner’s winery. For example, the Delèche estate near Villefranche-sur-Saône,
received grapes from about 28 hectares, and the winery had 12 different wine presses,
one for each of its vignerons. 66 Wine-making was managed personally by the land
owner or by their agent, and after fermentation the wine from each vat was divided by
somebody considered independent, with the owner and sharecropper both present, and
the same operation repeated with the ‘second’ wines.67 Only then could the
sharecropper take their wine home for storage and maturing.68 In France by the turn of
the twentieth century this form of organisation was found just in Beaujolais (and
Maconnais),69 although it was also common in Tuscany.70 Although it helped reduce
monitoring costs associated with dividing the harvest, it increased production costs.
Wine making at Château Malescot in Bordeaux for example cost 437 francs per hectare,
against 657 francs on the Deleche estate in the late nineteenth century.71
The fact that tenants were required to produce the wine in the landowners’
cellars helps explain why sharecropping was possible, but does not tell us why the
contract was more attractive to landowner than the labour contracts found, for example,
in Bordeaux or the Midi, or why sharecroppers did not attempt to become owner-
occupiers. The key to understanding these questions lies in the wine quality and market
volatility, and can be illustrated by examining briefly the events around the turn of the
twentieth century.
One important feature of the contract for landowners was that labour costs were
born by the sharecroppers, but when the poor harvests and exceptionally low prices of
65 Garrier, Paysans, 1, pp.152-3.
66 Château de L’Éclair had 16 wine presses. Ferrouillat and Charvet, Les Celliers, pp.381 and 389.
67 Ibid., p.380 and Myard, Vigneronnage, p.193.
68 Sharecroppers were not allowed to have wine making equipment in their own cellars. Ferrouillat and
Charvet, Les Celliers, p.380 and Cheysson, L’habitation, p.230.
69 See especially Ferrouillat and Charvet, Les Celliers. In addition Tourdonnet, Situation Du Métayage,
176, Myard, Vigneronnage, p.193. For the Maconnais, Goujon, La Cave, pp.132 and 198. It was also
found on some vineyards in Chateau Neuf du Pape (Vacluse) after phylloxera in the late nineteenth
century. Mesliand, Paysans Du Vaucluse, 1 pp 308-314. After 1945, as sharecropping returned to some of
Burgundy’s vineyards, sharecroppers also made their wine in the landowner’s cellar. Conseil Economique
et Social, Métayage., 2, p.145.
70 Galassi, ‘Moral Hazard’, pp.188-9. By contrast, Biagioli, Il Modello Del Proprietario Imprenditore ,
p.267, suggests that wine-making took place in the landowners cellars because of the tenants lack of
capital.
71 Ferrouillat and Charvet, Les Celliers, pp.360 and 388 .
15
the 1900s ruined many sharecroppers, landowners had to offer a new contract (grands
gagés) which guaranteed a salary instead.72 These contracts were similar to the prix-fait
found in Bordeaux, but for the sharecropper they contained limited incentives for good
work, and the low prices discouraged effective monitoring by the landowner. While
both landowners and tenants might have preferred sharecropping contracts, fixed wage
contracts were an acceptable substitute when market conditions were especially volatile,
and tenants required a guaranteed income. They continued to be offered in the interwar
period, and advertisements for employment in the Bulletin de l’Union Beaujolaise in
1923 gave workers the option of choosing between sharecropping or grands gagés.73
Sharecroppers might have preferred to be owner-occupiers themselves, but not
only was most of the suitable land in the region already under vines, but there were also
disadvantages associated with the family farm when better quality wines were being
produced such as in the Haut Beaujolais.74 There were economies of scale associated
with the selling of better quality wines, and the small growers lacked both the skills to
produce consistently good wine, and the capital to establish a cellar and to tie them over
after a poor harvest.75 One possibility was to move down the quality ladder, which had
the advantage of requiring less labour. Humbert Chatillon noted in 1906 that planting a
lower density of vines per hectare hung on trellises to facilitate the use of ploughs,
helped reduced grape disease, produced higher yields, but of poorer quality.76 Indeed,
on the plains of the Bas-Beaujolais, which were well suited to mechanisation and
producing large quantities of cheap wines, sharecropping was less common and
disappeared after 1900. However, the area of vines here also declined, because
production costs were high compared to those of the Midi with which it competed.
Sharecropping in Beaujolais was therefore linked to the production of better quality
wines requiring the presence of a specialist wine maker to supervise operations, and the
need for a labour intensive viticulture to provide a supply of suitable grapes. In a classic
sharecropping scenario, the contributions of the landowner and tenant complemented
each other. As a result, in the Haut Beaujolais sharecropping remained as common in
the mid twentieth century, as it had on the eve of phylloxera. A typical village such as
72 Vermorel and Danguy, Les Vins, p.17 and Myard, Vigneronnage., pp.262-3. On occasions landowners
also had to provide work animals.
73 Although rare, they were still present during the Second World War. Burel, Le Vignoble Beaujolais.,
p.39.
74 There is evidence that sharecroppers were able to save after the First World Way, but land
concentration continued to increase from the late nineteenth century until 1940. Garrier, Paysans., vol.1,
p.605.
75 Clique, Les Caves Coopératives, pp.97 and 141.
76 Chatillon, Le Beaujolais Viticole, pp.63-4 and 74.
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Ste. Etienne la Varenne in 1939 for example, had 140 growers of which 113 were
sharecroppers, and these were responsible for 212 of the village’s 267 hectares of
vines.77 Yet the northern Beaujolais was an exception: its wines were superior to most
other French wines (although inferior to those of Bordeaux or Burgundy where direct
cultivation was practiced). Landowners were highly active in monitoring both the grape
and wine making process, as well as in the selling of the wines.78 Sharecroppers
preferred increasing human asset specificity than moving to other wine-producing
regions and becoming owner-occupiers. Despite the advantages, in times of low prices,
landowners had to be prepared to guarantee a salary to attract and retain workers.
IV
A number of exogenous events during the period between 1860 and 1914
transformed traditional French viticulture, as the railways helped integrate national
markets, and higher wages and urbanisation led to consumption of vin ordinaire
doubling.79 Much of production had been traditionally located close to consumers, but
during the nineteenth century southern France (the Midi) saw its share of the national
output double from 20 to 40 per cent. The area of vines in the Midi increased from 209
thousand hectares in 1824/8 to 394 thousand in 1862, and 452 thousand by the 1900s.80
Being one of the first to suffer from phylloxera had the advantage that replanting took
place at a time of wine shortages and rising prices, which attracted large quantities of
outside capital.81 New technologies changed the nature of vineyard supervision and
reduced transaction costs, encouraging the creation of large estates and use of wage
labour and sometimes sharecropping contracts.82 According to one study at the turn of
the twentieth century, economies of scale began to be important on vineyards of over 30
hectares, and reached their maximum at between 60 and 80 hectares, with diseconomies
appearing on those estates of over 90 or 100 hectares.83 New vineyards were
established on the fertile plains rather than the hills, and growers used large quantities of
pesticides, fungicides, artificial fertilisers, and irrigation to improve yields. Yields were
77 Burel, Le Vignoble Beaujolais, p.43.
78 According to Goujon, most of them were négociants, although those landowners who lived in Lyon
needed a régisseur to supervise the cellar. Goujon, La Cave et Le Grenier, p.216.
79 Simpson, ‘Institutional Innovation’, pp.527-37.
80 Lachiver, Vignoble Français., pp.616-8. The four departments of the Midi are Aude, Gard, Hérault and
Pyrénées-Orientales.
81 Postel-Vinay, ‘Debt and Agricultural Performance’, p.169.
82 Simpson, Creating Wine.
83 Cited in Augé-Laribé, Le Problème Agraire, pp.119-22. The estates needed to be compact, as the
potential economies of scale were quickly lost if the vineyard was fragmented into a number of small
plots.
17
further increased by a light pruning and by the use of significant quantities of artificial
fertilisers. These changes, and those found in the winery, led to the term la viticulture
industrielle being coined by Augé-Laribé, first for the large wine estates in the Midi and
later for Algeria.
Sharecropping (complant) was used in some cases to replant vineyards destroyed
by phylloxera, or to establish new estates on the phylloxera-resistant coastal plain.
However one contemporary suggests it was disappearing by 1900,84 perhaps because of
the appearance of specialised equipment for planting new vineyards reduced labour
requirements, or because the flooded wine market had caused prices to collapse,
removing any incentives to plant at this time. Steam ploughs prepared the land for
planting, producing a considerable saving compared to manual labour. Deeper annual
ploughings were considered essential if the new, post-phylloxera vines were to produce
high yields, and were impractical on small or fragmented holdings. A distinction
developed in some areas between intensive, high-yielding ‘capitalist’ viticulture, against
lower yielding, labour intensive ‘peasant’ farming.85
Landowners redesigned their vineyards so that vines grew on wire trellises in
long straight lines, allowing ploughs and horse-drawn sprays to move between them
with ease, thereby cutting labour inputs and reducing monitoring costs associated with
wage labour.86 As supervisors could easily walk between the rows to check an
individual’s work, they achieved greater control over the speed and the quality of
operations such as pruning, spraying, cultivation and harvesting.87 As Jules Guyot,
perhaps the leading expert of the 1860s wrote:
A simple glance along the line of vines, permits the owner to spot the skill or the
negligence of his vinedressers, just as the foreman can control with the same
ease the quantity and quality of work of each of his workers.88
Guyot complained of the expense of local labour, but as phylloxera led to high wine
prices, owners of both capital and labour benefited, creating considerable regional
prosperity. From the late nineteenth century however wine and land prices slipped, and
then collapsed, but wages continued to increase. By 1900 the combination of a heavily
depressed wine market and the growing militancy of labourers were creating problems
for growers. Following the strikes of 1903/4, which raised wages and cut the working
84Vigouroux, Essai, p.105.
85 For Catalonia, see Carmona and Simpson, ‘Rabassa Morta’, p.307.
86 Génieys, La Crise Viticole, p.38, Gide, ‘La Crise du Vin’, pp.218-9, and Smith, ‘Work Routine’,
pp.364-75.
87 The use of secateurs instead of pruning knives reduced the work skills required.
88 Guyot, Culture de la Vigne, p.19.
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day, some looked to sharecropping as a means of reducing costs.89 For labourers,
sharecropping offered the possibility of increasing their incomes, as the quality of their
work and effort would be better rewarded. The experiment by Pierre Causse on his
highly mechanised and irrigated vineyard in Gard was widely reported at the time.
There were around fifty sharecroppers on the estate and the land was split into plots of
three hectares, which was considered the optimal for a husband and wife to work,
although extra labour was sometimes needed for the harvest. The owner provided all the
inputs, and crucially was responsible for making the wine and controlling the timing of
the farm operations, and in exchange received two-thirds of the wine, leaving a third for
the métayer. As Charles Gide noted, ‘in truth, the sharecropper here is nothing more
than the old day labourer carrying out the same tasks’.90 Gide calculated that a wage
labourer in the region earned approximately 800 francs a year compared to the 1,400
francs that the sharecropper enjoyed, assuming yields of 140 hectolitres of wine per
hectare, and a price of 10 francs a hectolitre.91 Gide talked of ‘a form of production co-
operative’, which benefited from the low monitoring costs associated with ‘la petite
culture’ and the economies of scale with ‘la grande culture’.92 Yet as Henry Gervais
pointed out, the problem of using sharecropping as a simple labour contract was that it
might guarantee employment, but wages were only paid annually, and income varied
significantly. In the years of poor harvests and low prices during the mévente of the
early 1900s, Pierre Causse was obliged to provide his sharecroppers with a guaranteed
salary of between 1,000 and 1,100 francs. As Henry Gervais noted, sharecropping was
unlikely to be found extensively in viticulture under these conditions.93
Yet sharecropping did not disappear from the Midi, and in the government
survey of 1929 around 5 per cent of Hérault’s vines were officially cultivated using this
contract (compared to 0.5 per cent in 1892).94 The situation was not so different in the
early 1950s, when 4 per cent of the Midi’s vineyards on the plain and 6 per cent on the
89 Gervais writes that if the 1892 census shows that sharecropping was unusual in the region, this was not
true a decade or two later. Gervais, La Rémunération du Travai, p.139.
90 Gide, ‘Un Nouveau Système’, p.88.
91 The calculation assumes 100 winter days employment at 2fr. 50; 100 summer days employment at 3 fr.,
and 50 days harvest labour at 5 fr. The sharecropper kept the produce of one of three hectares of vines
that they worked, but employed some extra labour at harvest time. Ibid., pp.88-9.
92 Ibid., p.91. Convert, ‘Le Vigneronnage’, p.578 for the association of capital and labour.
93 Gervais, La Rémunération., p.138.
94 Two sorts of contracts are described. The first type of contract had the landowners provide the chemical
inputs, and the tenant the labour, with the produce being split between the two. Contracts were for three,
six and nine years. The second allowed the métayer two thirds of the crop, but the vineyards were in a
state of neglect. Contracts could be ended with three months notice by either side. The survey was also
pessimistic about the future of the contract, arguing that towards the end of the lease the sharecropper
‘tries to increase profits at the expense of the land’. France. L'enquête…1929, pp.284-94.
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slopes were officially worked by sharecroppers. However these figures are distorted by
the widespread presence of family owned vineyards, as on vineyards of more than 25
hectares (the largest category used in the survey), sharecropping accounted for seven
and 19 per cent of vines respectively.95
V
According to Tourdonnet, a leading contemporary expert, French sharecropping
in viticulture was limited to those areas producing cheap wines, or where the vine was
cultivated in association with other crops.96 The 1892 survey confirms this, with
sharecropping being found on 35,000 hectares of vines in Gers and Lot et Garonne in
south-west France, and a further 20,000 hectares in five adjacent departments, covering
a fifth of the region’s vines. Together with another 12,000 hectares in the Gironde, these
eight departments accounted for more than half the sharecropping area under vines in
France (Table 4). In this region, most vines were found on medium sized farms
(métairies), where a single sharecropper carried out a wide variety of farming activities
including cereals, livestock and viticulture.97 Indeed, sharecropping was even more
common with other crops, accounting for between 20 and 50 per cent of the total area of
the department. As most wines were distilled to produce armagnac, they were few
problems associated with quality in the division of the harvest.98
[TABLE 4]
The area of vines increased from 112 thousand to 199 thousand hectares in Gers
and Lot et Garonne between 1826 and 1890, but jumped by a third between 1877 and
1886, as landlords took advantage of the destruction being caused by phylloxera in the
Cognac region.99 However, changes in the relative importance of the vine within the
métairie were not straightforward. In the first instance, tenants were usually obliged to
pay the landowner different shares of the harvest according to the product. When the
costs of monitoring the division of the harvest were very high, such as with milk,
vegetable or poultry, then landowners allowed sharecropper either to keep all the
95 Études et Conjoncture, (1955), p.535.
96 Tourdonnet, Situation Du Métayage., p.184.
97 Loré, Le Métayage, p.22.
98 According to Guyot,Ėtude des Vignobles., 1, pp.373-5, growers received 10 francs per hectolitre when
grapes were used for distilling, and 40 francs when they were sold for cheap wine..
99 Galet, Cépages, 2, p.2331.
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production, or pay a fixed annual amount.100 Wine clearly did not fall into these
categories, and attempts by the landowner to increase output implied that sharecroppers
might have less labour and time for other activities. Viticulture was especially labour
intensive and the appearance of vine diseases such as mildew and black-rot in the 1880s
required money to be spent on chemicals, as well as labour for their distribution.101 In
addition, the growing specialisation in viticulture threatened to change the relationship
between the landowner and métayer, as while the sharecropper wished to conserve their
independence, viticulture required an active intervention on the part of the landowner.102
Large scale viticulture implied an increase in the management responsibilities for the
owner and important organisational changes such as those found in Beaujolais. Many
landowners turned instead to brassiers, a type of labour contract similar to the prix-
faiteur.103 However prosperity was temporary, and the area of vines fell by 60 per cent
between 1893 and 1913, as phylloxera devastated the region, and prices fell because of
the replanting in Cognac.104 Out-migration and rising labour costs implied that
sharecropping never disappeared, although landowners were obliged to increase their
contributions of off-farm inputs, or provide compensation if the cereal or wine harvest
was poor.
VI
Sharecropping has traditionally been considered as an important impediment to
agricultural development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in countries such
as France and Italy. In recent years this interpretation has been radically challenged by
historians and the contract, frequently associated with viticulture, is believed to have
dealt efficiently with the problems of monitoring effort and moral hazard in the
vineyard in areas as diverse as Tuscany, Beaujolais or Catalonia. Yet despite these
apparent advantages, the contract was rare in most of Europe’s vineyards. This paper
has attempted to explain why, and suggests four factors which are often not given
enough attention in the literature.
100 On this point, but in a different context, see Carmona, ‘Livestock Specialization’, pp.252-3. In
Beaujolais, for example, it was common for sharecropper to pay two pails of milk weekly to landowners.
Cheysson, L’habitation, p.228.
101 Loré, Le Métayage, p. 84-7.
102 Ibid., p.106.
103 Ibid., p.88-89.
104 Galet, Cépages, vol.2, p.2331.
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In the first instance, historians and economists have underestimated the
difficulties associated with the landlord having to provide a sufficiently large farm to
provide exclusive employment for their tenants. If the sharecropper themselves owned
some land, then the landlord faced potentially high monitoring costs to guarantee that
their tenant did not undersupply effort, as they would keep all the additional production
on their own land, rather than just half, as argued by Marshall. A second, but
interrelated problem was that of risk, as most family operated farms obtained their
income from a variety of sources. Landowners therefore had to provide farms which
allowed tenants to produce a mix of crops, and not just wine (as they were able to do in
Beaujolais, south-west France or Tuscany), or be willing to assume the risks of crop
failure or low prices (Midi). The need to meet these two conditions helps explain the
relative absence of sharecropping in most regions of viticulture.
A third factor was that although sharecropping might be efficient in reducing
monitoring costs and moral hazard in the vineyard, the division of the harvest created
other costs. Landlords had to be present to collect their share, which in itself could
cause difficulties if the vineyard was heavily fragmented in different plots. These
problems were especially great when wine quality was an important factor, as the
possibilities for tenants to cheat increased significantly. They were not insuperable
however, as in Beaujolais (and Tuscany) sharecroppers were obliged to make the wine
in the owners’ cellar. The disadvantage was that it added to costs, and unlikely to be
used except when the landowner wished to market the wine themselves. Finally, wine is
less homogenous than most products and sharecropping was unattractive when fine
wines were produced, given the considerable skills and capital involved in wine-making
which the tenant lacked. Even if the sharecropper had received a small percentage of the
mature wine, they had neither the marketing skills to obtain a good price, nor the credit
to withstand market instability.
In a number of specific cases, sharecropping was undoubtedly an efficient
contract in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, its absence in
much of French viticulture by this date suggests that alternative contracts and
production systems were being used to avoid problems of effort and moral hazard. If
sharecropping was much more widespread in the eighteenth century as contemporaries
believed, then perhaps the Physiocrats and Arthur Young were correct to question its
efficiency when landowners were unable to supply tenants with sufficient land to
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control their effort, or when the crop mix was inappropriate for tenants to reduce risk.105
By contrast, in the long-run, shifts in consumer demand to farm products were quality
was an important factor in determining price, would have also reduced the interest in
sharecropping.
105 Estimates for the eighteenth century appear excessive: Dupré de Saint-Maur and Turgot suggested
that sharecropping covered four-sevenths of farm land Adam Smith, five-sixths, and Young, seven-eights.
Laborderie-Boulou, Le Métayage, p.51.
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APPENDIX.
Sharecropping was believed by many to be widespread in France, although
government statistics suggest that it was found on only a tenth of cultivated land in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (10.9 per cent in 1892, 10.4 per cent in
1929; and 10.9 per cent in 1946.106 However in France, as in other countries, there are
considerable problems in measuring the real importance of sharecropping, and one
recent study has referred to it as the ‘hidden’ contract.107 In France, the 1892 census,
which was one of the more complete surveys because it linked contracts with different
crops, treats all cash payments as rental contracts, even though some of these involved
sharecropping. Another problem is that farms and land are classified according to their
principal crop, so that plots of vines in zones of polyculture which were sharecropped
are excluded in both the major 1892 and 1929 censuses. Sharecropping contracts were
often oral, and in the 1892 survey these again were treated as rental contracts.108 Table 2
shows how different sharecropping and labour contracts are classified in the 1892
Enquête (survey).
106 France. L'enquête…1892, France, L'enquête…1929, and France. INSEE, Exploitations agricoles. By
contrast, Tourdonnet, Situation du Métayage, in 1879 gives a third of tenancies as being sharecropped,
against two third of the farms were let for cash rents, cited in Antoine, ‘Métayage, Farm Productivity, and
the Money Economy’, p.75
107 For England, see Griffiths and Overton, Farming to Halves; southern Italy, Cohen and Galassi,
‘Sharecropping and Productivity’, and for the US South, Alston and Kauffman, ‘Agricultural Chutes and
Ladders’, p.464.
108 Judt, Socialism in Provence.
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MAP 1: Vines in sharecropping in France in 1892.
[ ] > 17,4% vines in sharecropping
[ ] 8,3-17,4%
[ ] < 8,3 % (French average for vines)
● land in sharecropping (all crops) > 10,9 % (French average)
Sources: Appendix 1.
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Table 1
Skills, monitoring requirements, and asset specificity in viticulture and wine-
making, circa 1890.
common wines (traditional, pre-phylloxera vineyards)
skills monitoring specificity
land preparation none easy none
planting vines high difficult little
pruning high difficult little
annual tillage average average little
harvesting low easy none
wine-making average difficult little
common wines (Midi & Algeria estates; post phylloxera)
skills monitoring specificity
land preparation none easy none
planting vines high average none
pruning average average little
annual tillage average easy none
harvesting none easy none
wine-making high difficult little
premium or fine wines
skills monitoring specificity
land preparation none easy none
planting vines high difficult high
pruning high difficult high
annual tillage high average little
harvesting high difficult none
wine-making high difficult high
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Table 2
Examples of major sharecropping and labour contracts found in French
viticulture
Contract
name
Description Regional
location
Objectives How the contract
appear in Enquêtes
Complant Sharecropper creates a new
vineyard on uncultivated land in
a given time. Owner provides
land, inputs and supervision.
Indemnisation often provided if
tenant does not continue to
cultivate the mature vines.
Various
regions,
especially
Loire.
Establish new vineyards métayage
(sharecropping) or
fermage (fixed rent
tenancy)
Vigneronnage
à prix d’argent
Part time, fixed labour contract
to cultivate 2 hectares using
family labour (with 4 annual
payments). Annual but
renewable, and inherited.
Burgundy
(fine wines)
Supply of skilled labour and
allows the owner to keep all
the harvest, which is matured
in his / her cellar.
journalier or fermage
(oral contract)
Prix-faiteurs Worker carries out a set of fixed
task on a given area of land.
Bordeaux (fine
wines)
Supply of skilled labour.
Worker usually also enjoys
other sources of income
(often has small vineyard)
journalier or fermage
(oral contract)
Grands gagés Similar to prix faiteur Beaujolais
1900-1930
Supply of skilled labour journalier
Brassiers Similar to prix faiteur Armagnac Supply of skilled labour journalier
Vigneronnage
(métayage)
Sharecropper (2 hects. of vines
& 2 hects. of pasture). Required
to reside on farm, and prohibited
from working in other activities.
Sharecropper receives half of the
wine produced by the owner.
Beaujolais,
Maconnais,
and
Chalonnais
Supply of skilled labour.
Supervision and feeding of
seasonal and, occasionally
permanent workers. Wine
made on the owner’s
premises. Wine quality above
average.
metayage
Vigneronnage
(colonat
partiaire)
Similar to vigneronnage
(métayage), but without the
obligation of residing on the
vineyard. Landowner provides
inputs. Usually very small plots.
widespread Supply of skilled labour. metayage or fermage
(oral contract)
Ramonetage Foreman. Responsible for work
animals and feeding labourers.
Midi Foreman journalier
Régie Fixed salary and commissions.
Supervises labourers and
métayer (when owner absent). A
technician, found on large
estates.
Midi,
Burgundy,
Beaujolais
Foreman / manager owner cultivation with
Régie (manager and not
landowner)
Métayage
multiple
cropping
Sharecropper (20-60 hectares of
land, some vineyards). Required
to reside on farm, and prohibited
from working in other activities.
Sharecropper receives half of the
wine produced by the owner.
regions with
viticulture
Supply of labour. Wine made
on the owner’s/sharecropper
premises. Wine quality below
average. Supervision and
feeding of seasonal workers.
metayage
Tiers franc Neighbour cultivates vines in
exchange for 2/3 of harvest
Burgundy and
Champagne
Usually only when the
landowner was ill, a widow,
or too young
metayage
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Table 3
Contract choice and different regions, circa 1890
Premium winesVin
ordinaire. Bordeaux Champagne Burgundy Beaujolais
Land preparation o.o. wage o.o. vig s/c
Planting o.o. p.f. o.o. vig s/c
Cultivation o.o. p.f. o.o. vig s/c
Pruning o.o. p.f. o.o. vig s/c
Harvesting o.o. p.f. &
wage
o.o. vig s/c
Crushing grapes o.o. owner o.o. owner s/c -
owner
Wine-making o.o. owner maison owner s/c -
owner
Marketing merchant. merchant maison owner owner
o.o. = owner occupier;
wage = wage earner
p.f. = prix-faiteurs
maison = Champagne house
vig. = vigneron a prix d’argent
s/c = sharecropper
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TABLE 4 . VINES IN SHARECROPPING IN FRANCE in 1892.
Vines in
sharecroppping sharecropping ( in %)
Departement region in 000' has
%
sharecroppers
% vines in
sharecropping
% land in
sharecropping
(all crops)
Gers
Armagnac (South
West) 23,3 9,7 22,7 27,0
Gironde South West 12,2 11,8 8,8 16,9
Lot et Garonne
Armagnac (South
West) 11,9 17,6 21,1 29,2
Saône-et-Loire
Maconnais/chalonnais
(Burgundy) 7 12,9 27,9 15,2
Aude Midi 6,6 6,8 5,6 17,0
Rhone Beaujolais (Burgundy) 6 11,7 18,7 11,5
Landes South West 5,6 39,5 27,1 50,9
Garonne, Haute South West 4,3 12,0 8,5 21,5
Tarn-et-Garonne South West 4,3 11,1 17,7 19,5
Puy-de-Dôme Auvergne 3,6 5,1 8,1 10,4
Charente Cognac 3,5 14,8 20,2 32,7
Indre Loire 3,5 9,8 23,5 29,1
Tarn South west 3,4 20,4 23,0 28,8
Loire-Inférieur
Loire (included
Nantais) 3,3 12,9 10,8 10,1
Dordogne South West 3 17,8 13,8 33,1
TOTAL 15 DEPARTEMENTS 101,5 14,3 17,2 23,5
Herault Midi 0.9 1.6 1.4 8.1
TOTAL FRANCE 149 6,2 8,3 10,9
Source: France. L'enquête 1892
Note: In 1892 figures give 83.7 % of vines as being worked by landowners, 8.0 % of
vines leased (fermage) and 8.3 % found in sharecropping.
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